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Abstract
In parliamentary systems, political parties must often bargain with each other in
order to form a government. Do parliamentary rules regulating government forma-
tion impact the type of government that is formed? Existing scholarship suggests
that the need for an investiture vote - a requirement that a new government must
face a parliamentary vote at some point during its formation - reduces the likelihood
of a minority government. This paper suggests that while real–world investiture
rules can vary across several dimensions, only the investiture decision rule—which
specifies the size of the majority required for a decision to be made—impacts the
propensity for parties to form minority governments. Using new data on investiture
rules for 26 European countries since 1946 or the first year of democracy, we find
that parliamentary democracies that have an investiture requirement are not less
likely to experience minority governments than those where governments come to
power without an investiture vote. However, when an absolute majority is required
for a government to succeed at the investiture stage, minority governments are con-
siderably less likely to form; absolute majority investiture rules reduce the frequency
of minority governments.
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1 Introduction
Political parties compete in elections primarily in order to win oﬃce. The absence of a ma-
jority party in most parliamentary systems together with the rise of cabinet government
renders the game of government formation particularly important. Understanding which
parties coalesce and the form of the government remains the subject of significant schol-
arly inquiry. One important avenue of research has explored the role of political institu-
tions and rules, including the formal role of parliament in determining whether a majority
or minority government will form (see, for example, Bergman (1993), Bergman, Ersson,
and Hellström (2015), Conrad and Golder (2010), Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2002),
Eppner and Ganghof (2017), Müller and Strøm (2000), Rasch, Martin, and Cheibub
(2015a), Sieberer (2011), Strøm (1990), Strøm and McClean (2018), and Tsebelis and Ha
(2014). A minority government (or minority cabinet) is one where the parties holding
ministerial portfolios do not control a majority of seats in the legislature. Despite being
common in many countries and notwithstanding the existence of seminal research on the
topic (Strøm, 1990), minority governments remain something of a puzzle for scholars of
parliamentarism (Field, 2016; Rasch, 2011).
Building on this body of research, we investigate the relationship between parlia-
mentary investiture rules and minority governments. Investiture consists of a vote in
parliament to demonstrate that an already formed or about to be formed government
has legislative support. There is a general belief among scholars of parliamentarism that
the existence of an investiture requirement for a government to be formed makes the
emergence of minority governments less likely (Bergman (1993) provides a seminal con-
tribution in this regard). Investiture rules, however, vary across several dimensions: the
decision rule, the point in the formation process when a vote is taken (timing), the actor
in charge of proposing a formateur, the number of legislative chambers required to vote,
the subject of the vote, and the consequence of an investiture failure (Rasch, Martin,
and Cheibub, 2015b). However, the extent to which these features of investiture matter
for the formation of minority governments varies. We argue and show that investiture
votes decrease the likelihood of minority governments only when they require an absolute
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majority in order to be successful, that is, the support of more than half of the members
of parliament. The mere presence or absence of an investiture vote does not impact the
rate of minority government formation.
We base our empirical analysis on newly collected longitudinal data on national con-
stitutions and parliamentary procedures and practices in 26 parliamentary democracies.
This is the first multivariate analysis of complex investiture rules, where we move beyond
treating investiture votes as being either absent or present in a parliamentary democ-
racy. Our goal is not to provide a full explanation of minority governments. Rather, we
simply investigate which–if any–features of the complex investiture procedures we find in
practice matters for the formation of minority governments.
The remainder of the paper is organized at follows: Next, we review the extant
literature on institutions and government formation, with particular attention to the role
of institutions in the emergence of minority governments. In section three we describe
investiture procedures while paying attention to the reasons why each may or may not
aﬀect the frequency of minority governments. Section four presents our data and tests our
main hypothesis. The paper concludes with a review of the consequences of our findings
and suggestions for further research.
2 Institutions and (Minority) Government Formation
Initial oﬃce-oriented approaches to who gets to govern under parliamentarism, originat-
ing from rational choice accounts of party behavior, emphasized government formation
as a game involving the distribution of a fixed prize, generally conceived of as seats at
the cabinet table (Laver, 1988). Later work emphasized parties’ concern with policies
but remained largely devoid of institutions (Axelrod, 1970; DeSwaan, 1973). Departing
from the institution-free nature of both the oﬃce–and policy–based approaches, and in
tandem with the new institutionalism of the 1980s, coalition scholars began investigating
the role of rules and institutions in government formation. For example, Austin-Smith
and Banks (1988), Baron (1991) and Bäck and Dumont (2008) focus on the role of for-
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mateurs, and the importance of the order in which diﬀerent players get to attempt to
form a government, for helping to determine which parties will govern. Laver and Shep-
sle’s (1996) portfolio allocation model similarly elevates the importance of institutions,
suggesting that how cabinets work, and more specifically the degree to which individual
cabinet ministers enjoy policy autonomy, shapes the preferences of parties with regard to
coalition government.
It is in the context of models such as these that other work focused on some of the
specific parliamentary rules presiding over government formation. After all, as Bagehot
(1928) noted, “the elective function,” that is, the function of choosing the executive, may
be the main task of a parliament in a parliamentary system of government. Along these
lines, scholars have largely, though not exclusively, focused on the presence or absence of
an investiture requirement for the formation of governments. In some political systems,
parliament must vote to invest a government; in other systems this is not the case.
Investiture, in turn, may aﬀect both the process of government formation and the type
of government that ultimately emerges. The reason is that a formal investiture vote may
impose an immediate and significant hurdle for parties outside of the government since
they would have to publicly express their support for the government as a whole. To the
extent that some parties may be willing to tacitly but not publicly support a government
(Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994, 311), an investiture requirement may lead to longer
government formation processes while its absence may lead to more frequent minority
governments.
In this paper we are interested in the last eﬀect.1 Bergman (1993) distinguishes be-
tween ‘positive parliamentarism’ (a situation where an incoming government needs to be
explicitly supported by the parliament) and ‘negative parliamentarism’ (a situation where
the government must only be ‘tolerated by’ the parliament). Looking at patterns of gov-
ernment formation in Canada, Israel and 13 West European parliamentary democracies
between 1945 and 1987, and focusing only on countries with electoral systems likely to
1See De Winter (1995), Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998), De Winter and Dumont (2008), and
Conrad and Golder (2010) for analyses of the eﬀect of investiture on the duration of the formation
process.
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return ‘hung’ parliaments, he finds that 48 per cent of cabinets are minority governments
in systems with negative parliamentarism as compared to 25 per cent in systems with
positive parliamentarism. Subsequent empirical research appears to largely confirm the
relationship between the presence of an investiture procedure and patterns of minority
government (as well as other outcomes, such as duration of the formation process and
cabinet termination).2
Yet the reasoning supporting the impact of investiture rules is sometimes challenged.
The primary argument as to why an investiture vote should not aﬀect the nature of
the government in a parliamentary democracy relates to what some see as its intrinsic
redundancy in the face of no confidence procedures. Golder, Golder, and Siegel (2012,
p.430) summarize the logic of this argument as follows: “Ultimately, a parliamentary
government may be removed from oﬃce any time a majority of legislators decides that
this is what should happen. As a result, any incoming government must be able to survive
a vote of no confidence and, hence, enjoy the support of a legislative majority even if it
never has to explicitly demonstrate this through an actual vote.” Here we argue that this
is not generally true. As we will see next, when it comes to minority governments, the
specific design of the investiture procedure matters, making it in fact quite distinct from
a regular no confidence vote.
3 Dimensions of Parliamentary Investiture
Investiture rules are complex. We identify several dimensions along which investiture
procedures diﬀer in real-world settings. However, we argue that only one–the decision
rule–plays a role in preventing minority governments from emerging as the outcome of
inter-party bargaining over government formation. We briefly discuss each of these di-
mensions and then turn our attention to the diﬀerences in the decision rule required to
2The approach in cross-country analyses is to employ a dummy variable indicating the presence or
absence of an investiture vote (not counting the cases in which investiture is obtained with the support
of a negative majority). Examples of work that use the “investiture dummy” include De Winter (1995),
Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998), Diermeier and Stevenson (1999), Martin and Stevenson (2001),
Mattila and Raunio (2004), Bäck and Dumont (2008), De Winter and Dumont (2008), Conrad and
Golder (2010), Glasgow, Golder, and Golder (2011), and Bergman, Ersson, and Hellström (2015).
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invest a government.
We identify six dimensions of parliamentary investiture votes: the timing of the in-
vestiture; who nominates the formateur or the government; who votes to invest the
government; the target of the vote; the consequences of investiture failure; and the deci-
sion rule for successfully investing a government. We believe that only the last dimension
is likely to impact the likelihood that a minority government will emerge.
Timing: A vote of investiture can happen at two moments in the process of government
formation: before a (full) government is appointed (ex ante) or after appointment (ex
post). In the first case, investiture happens after a government formation process is set in
motion (that is, immediately after a new election or a government resignation) but before
a new government is appointed by the head of state. In the second case, the government
has already been appointed by the head of state and is formally empowered to act–it has
control of the state–but it is required to face a parliamentary vote. If it succeeds in that
vote, it remains in oﬃce; if it fails, it is required to resign and the process of forming a
government starts anew.3 While the timing of a vote can be important in many ways,
we do not believe it should impact the ability of parties to form a minority government.
Where an investiture vote exists, all players will anticipate that vote, regardless of which
stage of the formation process the vote takes place. Additionally, even at the ex ante
stage, parliamentarians often know what government the prime minister they are about
to vote on will establish. This was clear in the March 2018 government formation in
Germany, where members of the Bundestag already knew the name of ministers when
Merkel was voted into oﬃce. This is also illustrated by Ireland, where there is a vote on
the prime minister and one on the members of the government, typically with only a few
hours between the two. Thus, most of the information about the type of government to
be formed is already known or easily anticipated, even if the parliament is formally not
voting on the government but on the prime minister.
3These votes are not uncommon. Although they resemble a vote of confidence (and are often referred to
as such in constitutions) they diﬀer from the standard confidence vote in that governments must face
them and cannot use them strategically.
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Right to nominate: There are two basic approaches to nomination of a prospective prime
minister. In many countries the head of state nominates candidates formally and with
complete discretion. In other countries, nomination is generated in the parliament or is
mandated by the constitution. Nominations from parliament include cases in which it
is done by the president of parliament (as in Sweden or the Czech Republic), by groups
of MPs, or even by individual MPs. In Germany, for example, nomination requires 25%
of deputies, while in Poland it requires only 10%. In Finland and Ireland every deputy
has nomination rights. The constitutions of Bulgaria (1991) and Greece (1975), in turn,
pre-determine who should be nominated as formateur. The nomination rule may be
more significant as an agenda setting power in countries lacking an investiture vote; if
an investiture vote exists, the nominator needs to anticipate what will happen at the
investiture stage, where the decision rule is crucial. Therefore, we do not consider this
dimension in itself as important for the formation of minority governments.
Who votes: Parliaments can be unicameral or bicameral. In unicameral systems the
question of who votes is obvious. Bicameral systems, however, may require that only one
of the chambers participate in the formation of the government (e.g., Germany), or that
the government face an investiture vote in both chambers (e.g., Italy and Japan). All else
equal, involving more than one chamber adds a veto player and makes bargaining more
complex (Tsebelis, 2002). On the other hand, very few second chambers play a formal
role in government formation (Rasch, Martin, and Cheibub, 2015b). Thus, although it is
theoretically possible that having a second chamber participate in investiture may aﬀect
the likelihood of minority governments, we do not consider this feature in our empirical
analysis because not enough cases exist.4
4Although 16 countries in our dataset have bicameral legislatures, only 2 clearly require dual-chamber
investiture: Italy and Romania. Belgium is an ambiguous case. Between 1923 and 1995, investiture
required the vote of both parliamentary chambers. The 1993 constitutional reform made the government
accountable only to the House. Still, in 2003 the Senate voted on an incoming government (André,
Depauw, and Deschouwer, 2015).
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Target of the vote: Although they all happen with the goal of forming a government,
investiture votes diﬀer as to what exactly is being voted on. These votes are focused
on electing or confirming confidence in one or a combination of the following: a head of
government, the cabinet, or the government’s policy platform. It may be the case that it
is easier for a non-coalition party to oﬀer legislative support in an investiture vote when
the vote concerns only the personnel of government and not the details of the govern-
ment’s policy platform. On the other hand, it is unlikely that any party will support an
investiture vote absent some coordination on what the government plans to do in terms
of public policy. For this reason, again, while potentially important for the government
to be formed, we do not expect that this dimension of the investiture process will matter
for the formation of minority governments.
Investiture failure: With the exception of Norway, assembly dissolution and early elec-
tions always loom in the background of any government formation process in parlia-
mentary systems. In some countries, even though a government must be invested by
parliament, the rules are silent as to what happens in case of failure. In these cases, prac-
tice and the distribution of seats determine whether a new attempt is made or whether
new elections are called. In other systems, however, the constitution stipulates not only
the sequence of moves in the government formation process, but also the number of times
it can be repeated, the actor who nominates candidates in each attempt, the decision rule
to be adopted in each of them, and the reversal point if all attempts fail. In some cases,
the identity of the actor moving first and the decision rule changes with each attempt.
The shadow of elections should encourage parties to facilitate minority governments, all
else equal. But we do not know, and have no reason to believe one way or the other,
whether making dissolution a requirement after a finite number of attempts makes actual
dissolution more or less likely than having it as an implicit (and discretionary) possibil-
ity. Our sense, however, is that few cases of mandatory dissolution after successive failed
investiture attempts reach that point.
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Decision rule: By decision rule we mean the actual rules governing the vote on the investi-
ture of the government. It defines the requirement for winning, and translates individual
votes into an unambiguous collective choice (Rasch, 1995). Three decision rules seem to
be employed in practice (at initial stages of voting): negative majority, simple majority,
and absolute majority. Absolute majority means that the investiture is successful if more
than 50 percent of the chamber’s members vote in favor of the formateur or government.
A simple majority means that a successful investiture requires that a majority of those
present and voting (assuming a quorum of less than the full membership) are in favor
of the government to be formed. A negative majority assumes a successful investiture
unless a majority (typically an absolute majority) votes against the government.
Each of these rules gives rise to diﬀerent strategic situations (Vermeule, 2007) and,
as we will see below, poses increasing hurdles for the formation of minority governments.
Generally speaking, this is so due to the role abstentions play under each of them. In a
chamber of N legislators, absolute majority requires that the government receive more
than (N/2) positive votes in order to be invested. In this case, the number of votes nec-
essary for successful government formation is fixed and not subject to strategic manipu-
lation. In the same chamber, simple majority implies that investiture will be successful
if the government receives more than ((N A)/2) positive votes, where A is the num-
ber of members not voting. If no one abstains, absolute and simple majority imply the
same number of votes for a successful investiture. As the number of abstainers increases,
however, the number of votes necessary for a government to be invested decreases. Ab-
stainers, therefore, always help the government by making the number of votes necessary
for investiture smaller. This does not mean that investiture will be automatic; just as it
may be costly to acquire positive votes, it could also be costly to convince adversaries to
abstain. Finally, under absolute negative majority rule, positive votes and quorum re-
quirements do not really matter. What is important is to avoid a majority of “no” votes.
In a way, this is similar to the situation in which no investiture is required and, once in
power, the governments can be removed by a no-confidence vote of an absolute majority:
in both cases, the government is in power, unless a majority mobilizes against it. The
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important diﬀerence is that in one case an investiture vote is required, whereas removing
the government through a no confidence vote requires that someone in the opposition set
the process in motion. Moreover, given the diﬀerential role of abstentions under absolute
and simple majority rules, investiture based on negative absolute majority makes it easier
for a government to be formed than a situation in which no investiture is required: in
the former case, abstentions count in favor of the government whereas in the latter they
count against the government.
How will diﬀerent decision rules aﬀect the likelihood that a minority government will
form? First, consider the situation in which no investiture is required. This means that
governments will be formed without the direct participation of parliament and parliamen-
tary involvement in whether the government will exist can only occur ex post facto. In
this case, a minority government may come about unless a majority of parliamentarians
finds it in its interest to block it by proposing and voting in favor of a motion of no confi-
dence following the installation of the government. Typically, the anticipation of such an
event is suﬃcient to ward oﬀ the potential government. But if a suﬃcient number of MPs
are reluctant to openly support no confidence at this initial stage, a minority government
might be the consequence. Similarly, in the case of a negative majority investiture rule,
it takes an absolute majority to hinder a minority government from emerging, and if feel-
ings towards the potential minority government are mixed in the opposition camp, this
type of government may form. The relevant point here is that in both cases, a minority
government may emerge because preventing it requires that the opposition bears some
cost of mobilizing for action. Under negative investiture rules, the action consists of mo-
bilizing opponents to vote against the government being invested; under no investiture
rules, the action consists of mobilizing opponents to vote against a government already
in power. In both cases, the status quo favors the government and the costs of change
are borne by the opposition.
The situation is more restrictive in the case of a simple majority investiture. A
minority government can only form if some section of the opposition abstains from voting
(or vote in favor of the government they do not participate in). In contrast to the case
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with no investiture at all, it is not suﬃcient that parts of the opposition do nothing or just
refrain from supporting a no confidence motion; at the least, for a minority government
to form under a simple majority decision rule, part of the opposition must behave as if
it were indiﬀerent towards the government by abstaining. Thus, compared to the cases
in which no investiture is required, or the decision rule is a negative majority, a simple
majority requirement for a successful investiture makes it slightly harder for minority
governments to emerge (everything else equal).
The formation of a minority government is considerably harder if an absolute majority
is required for a successful investiture: a minority government can only form if enough
opposition MPs are willing to vote in favor of a cabinet they are not part of. Under
normal circumstances, this should be rare and mainly happen in cases where the minor-
ity government has reached an agreement with the part of the opposition that provides
the necessary votes at the investiture stage. This means that if minority governments
emerge at all under absolute majority investiture, they are only formal minority govern-
ments (resting on a formal agreement of some kind with parts of the opposition). In
other words, we expect minority governments to become less likely as the hurdle of the
investiture decision rule increases from completely absent or negative to simple majority
and from simple to absolute majority: absolute majority requires parts of the opposition
to explicitly support the minority government; simple majority requires parts of the op-
position to (at least) abstain from voting; and no investiture just requires the opposition
to remain passive, that is, not initiate and support no confidence.
Let us give some examples of investiture decision rules. In Sweden and Portugal,
for instance, the vote that takes place at the moment of investiture requires a negative
majority for success: a candidate for Prime Minister (Sweden) or a government that
presents itself to the parliament for a required vote (Portugal) survives unless an absolute
majority votes against it. In these countries, investiture represents the formalization of
a procedure that is actually weaker than the situations in which governments come into
power without any formal participation of parliament. The investiture vote in Sweden in
1978 represents an extreme example of this scenario. The candidate for Prime Minister,
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Ola Ullsten, was supported by 39 out of the 349 members of the Riksdag, 11.1%. A
majority of 66 MPs voted against Ullsten, and a total of 215 abstained. One year later
Torbjörn Fälldin was a candidate. He was supported by 170 MPs. It did not matter that
a majority of 174 voted against Fälldin, as long as this number was less than an absolute
majority of at least 175 MPs (i.e. 349/2) (Wockelberg, 2015). As a final example, the
government that was invested in Sweden on January 21, 2019, received 115 votes in favor
and 153 votes against, with 77 abstentions. Success was obtained because some of those
who voted against the formateur in earlier investiture votes now abstained.5
Simple majority is the most common investiture procedure: a government is invested
if, given a quorum, more MPs vote in favor than against it. Examples are the French
Fourth Republic between 1954 and 1958, Belgium before the constitutional amendment
that became eﬀective in 1995, Bulgaria and the United Kingdom.6 Finland introduced
a simple majority investiture in the new constitution of 2000. The rules in Finland are,
however, slightly more complex. Three possible investiture rounds are specified: in the
first two, the parliament votes on a prime minister (who has previously negotiated the
government program and composition) by simple majority; if none of the previous rounds
are successful, in the third and last round, the parliament votes by plurality (first-past-
the-post). The candidate with more votes than any other is elected (any abstention not
registered or counted). It is easy to see that the party with a plurality of seats has a
privileged bargaining position: if the last stage of the process is reached and other parties
do not coalesce to form a bigger plurality, it can reasonably expect to get its candidate for
prime minister elected. Finally, in Greece, investiture requires simple majority of those
present and voting, provided that this majority constitutes at least 40% of the MPs.
This means that a simple majority of less than 2/5 of the assembly is not suﬃcient to
install a government. This provision limits, but does not eliminate, the strategic use of
abstentions.
A number of countries have or had absolute majority investiture. The Fourth French
5In line with the literature, in our empirical analysis we code Sweden and Portugal as not having an
investiture vote.
6For the United Kingdom, see (Kelso, 2015).
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republic used absolute majority until 1954, as has Germany since 1949. More recently,
several countries in the Eastern part of Europe introduced absolute majority investiture
rules, like Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Like Finland, some of these countries
also have complex rules. Germany potentially conducts two rounds with absolute major-
ity, before the decision partly slips into the hands of the president. To be more specific,
if a third round is needed, the decision rule is lowered to plurality. The president may
however ignore a third-round vote, and dissolve the parliament and call new elections.
This has never happened, and one should expect that parliamentary actors would be very
reluctant to lose the power of the decision to the president (Sieberer, 2015). Therefore,
it is natural to regard Germany as a case of absolute majority investiture. Spain also
has a complex investiture procedure, with an absolute majority requirement in the initial
round. If unsuccessful, the decision rule in the next round is simple majority. Second
round decisions have occurred several times in practice (Ajenjo, 2015). This means that
in the Spanish case, formateurs need no more than the backing of a simple majority in
order to be successful; if there is no absolute majority, parliamentary actors just move to
the second stage. Thus, even if both Germany and Spain have absolute majority initially,
they diﬀer in what happens in successive stages. While in Germany the last move be-
longs to the president, the absolute majority required in initial rounds becomes eﬀective;
because in Spain the majority required to invest the government is lowered after the first
failure, the system works in practice as a case of simple majority investiture.
Thus, minority governments are unlikely only when the decision rule presents a sig-
nificant hurdle, that is, when it requires that opposition parties or representatives either
have to abstain from voting or support a government of which they are not part. The
latter case, which occurs under absolute majority investiture, clearly makes minority
governments less likely.
We next examine the relationship between investiture votes based on absolute majority
and the emergence of minority governments. Table A1 in the appendix characterizes each
of the 26 European countries in our dataset in terms of the six investiture characteristics
discussed in the section. In light of the argument developed here, we expect minority
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governments to be equally likely in countries with no investiture of any type and those
with an investiture regime based on decision rules other than absolute majority. For this
reason, we structure our analysis as a comparison of investiture regimes that call for the
support of an absolute majority of legislators versus all other cases.
4 Investiture Procedures in Action
Our goal is to empirically examine the impact of absolute majority investiture rules on the
emergence of minority governments. We do not expect to find a correlation between the
mere presence of an investiture requirement and the incidence of minority governments.
The lack of such relationship can be eyeballed in table 1, where countries are ranked by
the frequency of minority governments. As we can see, investiture votes are required in
countries located in every section of the table: the presence of an investiture requirement
combines with majority as well as minority governments. This is also true, as we will see,
in multivariate analysis.
Our investiture dataset is original (Bucur et al., 2019). The original dataset includes
26 European countries observed between 1918 and 2017. Due to limitations regarding
other data, the analysis here only covers the post-1945 period. We have information on
investiture and legislative support for 780 governments, of which 75 were caretaker and
hence excluded from the analysis.7 One hundred and eight of the 705 remaining cabinets
were formed in majority situations, that is, situations in which one party held a majority
of legislative seats. We also exclude these cases from our analysis. In the end, we have
597 fully empowered cabinets in minority situations.
In the dataset, 312 of the 597 cabinets (52%) were formed under constitutions that
required an investiture vote in parliament. Regarding the decision rule, the most common
is simple majority, which was used in the formation of 45.1% of the cabinets in countries
7Data about the number of seats held by the parties in the government in the lower or only chamber
come from PARLGOV (Döring and Manow, 2018). We cross-checked and updated this dataset, primar-
ily by using Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000); Seki and Williams (2014), and country reports
in the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook between early 1990 and 2014.
Investiture rules were coded from constitutions, supplemented by information from parliamentary Rules
of Procedure and country chapters in Rasch, Martin, and Cheibub (2015a)
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Table 1: Cabinets by majority status in European parliamentary democracies, 1946–2015
Minus Minus Majority Full power minority in minority situations
Country Total Caretaker Situations Number Proportion Full Power
Belgium II 12 9 9 0 0.0
Finland II 10 10 10 0 0.0
Germany 25 25 23 0 0.0
Luxembourg 21 19 17 0 0.0
Poland I 1 1 1 0 0.0
Netherlands 32 23 23 1 4.3
Austria 33 28 22 2 7.1
Belgium I 34 30 27 3 10.0
Greece 23 18 4 2 11.1
United Kingdom 24 24 4 3 12.5
Iceland 34 31 31 4 12.9
France III 38 33 19 5 15.2
Hungary 11 11 8 2 18.2
Slovakia 15 10 9 2 20.0
Finland I 45 38 38 9 23.7
Slovenia 16 16 16 4 25.0
Estonia 15 15 15 4 26.7
Latvia 22 22 22 6 27.3
France II 8 7 7 2 28.6
Lithuania 18 17 12 5 29.4
Portugal 21 17 13 5 29.4
Italy 65 62 59 20 32.3
France I 16 12 12 4 33.3
Ireland 26 26 18 10 38.5
Poland II 19 17 17 7 41.2
Bulgaria 13 9 6 4 44.4
Croatia 9 9 9 4 44.4
Czech Republic 14 11 11 5 45.5
Sweden I 14 14 10 7 50.0
Romania 21 21 19 12 57.1
Spain 12 12 7 7 58.3
Norway 59 54 45 38 70.4
Sweden II 17 17 17 14 82.4
Denmark 37 37 37 34 91.9
Total 780 705 597 225 31.9
Source: Bucur et al. (2019) Gray rows are countries with some kind of investiture requirement (exclud-
ing those countries where parliament votes on a government but the rule is a negative majority or lower
level plurality). The time period is 1946–2015. Multiple entries for the same country represent diﬀerent
decision rules for investiture. The years for each of these cases are as follows: Belgium I (1946–1994)
and II (1995–2015); Finland I (1946–1998) and II (1995–2015); France I (1946–1953), II (1954–1958),
and III (1959–2015); Poland I (1989) and II (1990–2015); Sweden I (1946–1973) and II (1974–2015).
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where investiture was required. These include Spain and Slovenia, where the first attempt
to invest a government is based on absolute majority and the last one is based on simple
majority. In these cases, the absolute majority rule does not bite since actors know they
can form a government by simple majority in the absence of an absolute majority (as
discussed above). Three countries adopt a negative majority rule: Belgium since 1995,
Portugal since its democratization in 1976, and Sweden since 1974; 39 full cabinets were
formed under these rules. Finally, 42.8% of the cabinets in countries where an investiture
vote is required adopted absolute majority. They include Croatia, France between 1946
and 1953, Germany, Romania and Hungary.
Table 2 presents the frequency of full-power minority cabinets, conditioned on two
dummy variables: the “investiture dummy,” which flags all cases of investiture, and the
“absolute majority dummy,” which indicates the cases in which the support of an absolute
majority is required for a successful investiture. The first variable, thus, contrasts cases
with and without an investiture, that is, the cases the literature refers to as positive and
negative parliamentarism.8 The second variable allows the comparison between the cases
of investiture by absolute majority with those cases with no investiture or with investiture
based on a diﬀerent decision rule. The literature on coalition formation universally counts
any change in the partisan composition of a cabinet as a new government. Some of these
changes, however, do not trigger a vote of investiture for the “new government.” For
example, if a party leaves a minimal winning coalition mid-term, the government becomes
a minority cabinet even as the prime minister and most other ministers remain in power.
It is rare for cabinets like these to be the subject of a vote of investiture. But in this case,
whatever association the investiture variables may have with the emergency of minority
governments will be weakened. Thus, we also distinguish the cabinets that were formed
following an election. In so doing, we can be assured that all governments in which some
kind of investiture vote is required did in fact face one. The drawback, as can be easily
noted, is that we also sharply reduce the number of governments we have to work with.
Turning to the table, we can see that countries with investiture requirements—of
8To recall, in line with the literature, we code cases of investiture in which a negative majority is required
for success not having investiture.
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Table 2: Percent and umber of cabinets by cabinet status in European
parliamentary democracies, 1946–2015
All Cabinets Post-election Cabinets
Investiture Rules Percent Number Percent Number
No Investiture 42.5 (285) 39.3 (183)
Investiture 33.3 (312) 29.7 (148)
No Investiture or
Non-absolute majority rule 40.9 (445) 40.2 (256)
Absolute majority rule 28.3 (152) 17.3 (75)
Source: Bucur et al. (2019)
any type—have fewer minority governments than those with no investiture. The same
is true, although less markedly, when we exclude cabinets formed in the middle of the
legislative term. Countries with an absolute majority investiture requirement too have
fewer minority governments than both countries with investiture based on a decision rule
less strict than absolute majority, and countries without any type of investiture. The
question, of course, is whether these diﬀerences are also observed when we consider other
aspects that also aﬀect the emergence of minority governments. We turn now to such
an analysis. To anticipate, we find that the “investiture dummy” is not associated with
minority governments, and that the “absolute majority dummy” is, but only in formations
that follow an election.
In order to analyze the relationship between investiture and minority governments in
a multivariate context, we replicate Strøm and McClean’s (2018) analysis, which repre-
sents, to our knowledge, the most complete and systematic eﬀort to assess empirically the
impact of diﬀerent factors on the frequency of minority governments.9 We add to their
empirical model (in separate estimations) the two dummy variables related to investiture
defined in the previous paragraph. Our expectation is that the “investiture dummy” will
not be associated with the incidence of minority governments, while the “absolute ma-
jority dummy” will have a negative, statistically and substantively significant association
9In tables A.2 and A.3 we use the PARLGOV dataset to approximate as much as possible Strøm and
McClean’s analysis. The findings regarding the investiture variables remain the same, but the control
variables do not perform well. We feel buttressed in our conclusion about investiture, but do not place
much stock on the control variables, which had to be considerably adapted to replicate Strøm and
McClean, even in spirit.
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with minority governments. This should be particularly true in post-election government
formations.
In their analysis, Strøm and McClean consider four groups of factors that may aﬀect
the emergence of minority governments. The first group includes a measure of ideological
distance of the parties represented in parliament (polarization) and a measure of the
fragmentation of the legislative party system. This group also includes a measure of the
bargaining power of the largest and of the median parties (median party bargaining power
and largest party bargaining power). All of these variables are expected to be positively
associated with the emergence of minority governments. In the original analysis, Strøm
and McClean also include an indicator of post-election formations, which we will use not
as an independent variable, but as a factor to create a subset of formation cases (as we
did in table 2).
The second group of variables consists of indicators for the country’s institutional
structure: the strength of prime ministerial powers, the constitutional structure (semi-
presidential or not), and investiture (which they refer to as positive parliamentarism).
The first two variables are expected to be positively associated with minority governments
(both an institutionally powerful prime minister and a directly elected president, they
argue, “may oﬀset the lack of a parliamentary majority” (Strøm and McClean, 2018, 10).
The variable about positive parliamentarism is, of course, our variable of interest here
and will be replaced with the two dummy variables previously defined. The third factor
is related to the policy-making strength of the opposition, a factor that is expected to
be positively associated with minority governments. It is measured through a count of
permanent legislative committees in the lower or only chamber. The final set of variables
consists of a measure of the bargaining environment (the duration in days of the formation
process), and a measure of electoral volatility. Both variables are expected to be positively
associated with minority governments.
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimates of logit coeﬃcients resulting from regressing an
indicator of minority governments on the investiture and other variables just discussed.
There are three diﬀerences with respect to Strøm and McClean (2018), which we wish
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Table 3: Logistic regression of minority government on the “investiture dummy” and other
factors
All Cabinet Formations Post–Election Cabinets
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Investiture -0.0645 0.2389 0.1606 0.3122
Fragmentation -0.0155 0.1184 0.1685 0.1588
Largest party bargaining power 0.5413 0.8969 0.6607 1.1793
Median party bargaining power -1.7924*** 0.6956 -1.6605* 0.8978
Polarization 0.0071 0.0049 0.01612** 0.0065
Semi-presidentialism -0.4581 0.3227 -0.7430 0.4777
PM institutional strength 0.1677 0.1413 0.2586 0.2054
Formation duration -0.0150*** 0.0040 -0.0200*** 0.0059
Cabinet electoral volatility 0.0357* 0.0217 0.0160 0.0277
Constant -0.3870 0.8034 -1.8163* 1.0943
Obs 458 309
Pseudo R2 0.0844 0.1303
Marginal eﬀect of investiture variable 0.0133 0.0286
Note: * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Variables defined in the Appendix.
to highlight: first, we use the investiture variables that we created; second, instead for
including a control variable for post-election cabinets, we separately estimate a model for
all cabinets and one for post-election cabinets only; finally, because we were not able to
obtain the variable on the number of committees, it is not included it in the regression.
As can be seeing in table 3, simply having some kind of investiture is not associated
with the emergence of minority governments, either when we consider all cabinets or when
we only consider post-election cabinets. The estimate is that the likelihood of observing
a minority government increases 17 percentage points when one moves from a country
in which there is no investiture or investiture is not based on absolute majority, to one
in which a successful government needs to be explicitly supported by more than 50%
of the members of parliament. When it comes to minority governments, countries like
Italy, Ireland, Spain and Slovenia, where the constitution requires that governments be
invested by parliament are equivalent to governments like Denmark, where parliament
is not directly involved in the formation of the government. Thus, when other factors
that impact government formation are held constant, we find that only a specific type
of investiture vote likely prevents the formation of minority governments: systems such
as the one that existed in France between 1946 and 1954, and now exists in Croatia,
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Table 4: Logistic regression of minority government on the “absolute majority dummy” and
other factors
All Cabinet Formations Post–Election Cabinets
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Absolute majority -0.2884 0.3387 -1.1402** 0.5142
Fragmentation -0.0233 0.1175 0.1857 0.1629
Largest party bargaining power 0.4300 0.9033 0.1460 1.2233
Median party bargaining power -1.8251*** 0.6721 -1.5548* 0.9053
Polarization 0.0067 0.0049 0.0134** 0.0065
Semi-presidentialism -0.4220 0.3127 -0.8450 0.4861
PM institutional strength 0.2081 0.1499 0.4741 0.2295
Formation duration -0.0151*** 0.0040 -0.0177*** 0.0057
Cabinet electoral volatility 0.0371* 0.0216 0.0201 0.0279
Constant -0.3356 0.8024 -1.8233 1.1209
Obs 458 309
Pseudo R2 0.0855 0.1439
Marginal eﬀect of investiture variable 0.0578 0.1740
Note: * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Variables defined in the Appendix.
Germany, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, where a majority larger than 50% of members
of parliament needs to vote in favor of government for it to be formed.
Note that the model of minority governments in post-election cabinet formations in
table 4 does help predict minority governments: the unconditional probability that a
minority government will emerge is 30%; information about the covariates in the table
improves prediction to 77%. If all we knew were the frequency of minority governments
conditioned on absolute majority rule investitures, we would be able to correctly predict
66% of the cases. Yet, of eight co-variates, we find that, in addition to absolute ma-
jority investiture, only two are associated with the incidence of minority governments:
the bargaining power of the median party and the duration of the bargaining process
leading to the formation of the government. Both variables are associated with less fre-
quent minority governments across all four models estimated in tables reftab:tab3 and 4.
As mentioned above, both were expected to be associated with more frequent minority
governments.10
10Strøm and McClean (2018) also found a negative eﬀect of bargaining duration on minority government.
Additionally, they found that the bargaining position of the largest party, polarization, the number of
permanent committees, and the cabinet electoral volatility had a positive and statistically significant
eﬀect on minority governments.
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5 Conclusion
Under parliamentarism, governments emerge from, and remain responsible to, the legisla-
ture. How parliament determines who governs is a question of theoretical and normative
significance. Despite the advanced nature of coalition research, we still know relatively
little about the rules of the government formation process and how they impact the type
and composition of governments.
In this paper we questioned existing research on the relationship between investi-
ture procedures and the prevalence of minority governments. Including an indicator for
whether governments must face an investiture vote, of any type, has become the rule
in cross-national studies of government formation. We argue, however, that the mere
requirement that an investiture vote be taken is not suﬃcient to characterize investiture
procedures that really bite. Not all forms of investiture eﬀectively constrain the options
available to parties and aﬀect the calculus by parties and individual legislators about
the kind of support they will give the government to be formed. Our empirical analysis
provides support for this more nuanced view of the investiture vote. This vote modifies
the government formation process, that is, it makes the emergence of minority govern-
ments less likely, only when it requires that an eﬀective parliamentary majority make
the decision, that is, a majority of all members of parliament. Otherwise, investiture is
irrelevant for the type of government – minority or majority – that will emerge.
There is, of course, more to be explored about investiture procedures than what we
did here. Our analysis can be extended in at least four ways. First, by broadening the
set of dependent variables. Beyond shaping the formation process, do investiture rules
impact the survival-rate of governments and in particular the longevity of coalition and
minority governments? As with government formation, the termination of coalition gov-
ernments is an advanced area of study in comparative politics. The general expectation
is that governments facing an investiture process are more likely to have shorter dura-
tions, all else equal (Warwick, 1994). One would want to investigate how variation in
the detail of investiture rules, cross-nationally and also over time within the same legis-
lature, impacts the longevity of governments. Second, our analysis could be extended by
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expanding geographic coverage to include less traditional parliamentary systems, that is,
parliamentary systems in non-European settings. Third, an additional important issue
is to investigate the reasons why investiture procedures were first adopted. As we have
shown elsewhere [citation withheld], formal investiture requirements are not a feature of
early parliamentary (not necessarily democratic) regimes. Moreover, we also found that
there is a correlation between constitutions that grant the executive strong powers to
aﬀect the legislative agenda and investiture rules that require an absolute majority for
the government to be formed.
Finally, one may want to explore in detail what we believe to be “oﬀ the regression
line” deviant cases. The deviant cases include countries such as Italy, Ireland, the Czech
Republic and Romania, which have an investiture mechanism but in which the rate of
minority government is relatively high. Part of the reason for this, as we learned here, is
that, except for Romania, the investiture procedures in these countries are weak; but what
are the factors that, in these other countries, account for the high incidence of minority
governments? Another set of deviant cases includes countries such as the Netherlands,
Iceland and Austria, which have no formal investiture requirements, no majority parties,
but in which we observe almost always majority governments. This could arise because
there exists other norms or rules in these systems that are functionally equivalent to
(or even stronger than) the investiture mechanism. We believe both types of deviant
cases to be somewhat puzzling, particularly from within the generally accepted paradigm
that institutions matter.11 We hope a closer analysis will provide new insights into,
and information about, the nature of party politics, legislative rules, and the politics of
government formation.
11see Andeweg, De Winter, and Dumon (2011) for a series of papers with a focus on deviant cases in
government formation.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definition and Sources
Tables 2 and 3 in the main text present the result of a logistic regression of minority gov-
ernment on our investiture variable of interest and several control variables. The model,
with the few modifications discussed in the main text, replicates the analysis in (Strøm
and McClean, 2018).
We use two investiture variables, which we generated ourselves Bucur et al. (2019). Their
definition is as follows:
Investiture
Dummy variable coded 1 when a country requires some kind of investiture for a govern-
ment to be successfully formed, 0 otherwise. To conform with the literature (see Bergman
(1993)) we code the cases of investiture based on negative majority rule as not having an
investiture.
Absolute majority
Dummy variable coded 1 when a country requires an investiture vote using a decision
rule based on absolute majority, that is, the support of more than 50% of the members
of the lower or only legislative chamber, 0 otherwise.
All other variables come from the European Representative Democracy Data Archive
(ERDDA) (Anderson, Bergman, and Ersson, 2014). The definitions and the number of
the ERDDA variable are reproduced below.
Fragmentation
V309e. Eﬀective number of parliamentary parties, lower chamber; coding: # (unit =
parties).
Largest party bargaining power
V313e. Bargaining Power of Largest Party; coding: # (unit = Banzhaf Index); notes:
Coded in-house 2012, re-calculated for all cabinets.
Median party bargaining power
V408e. Median party bargaining power; coding: # (unit = Banzhaf Index).
Polarization
v407e: Polarization (BP Weighted); coding: # (manifesto points); notes: party mani-
festo data. Coded in-house 2012, re-calculated for all cabinets: Polarization is based on
the equation presented in Bergman et al. (2008, p.112), v082y where: b is for bargaining
power of party i, x is the left-right position of party i, and x¯ is the weighted average
left-right positions of all parties.
Semi-presidentialism
v518e: Semi-presidentialism; coding: 1 = YES, 0 = NO; notes: 1 = Finland (–2000),
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France, Greece (–1985), Portugal (–1982).
PM institutional strength
V514e: PM cabinet powers (3); coding: 1 to 3; notes: One point for each existing Prime
Minister power. Consists of right to appoint (i) and dismiss (ii) ministers, and ministers
being parliamentary accountable through the PM only (iii).
Formation duration
V600e: Cabinet bargaining duration; coding: # (days).
Cabinet electoral volatility
V701e: Average cabinet electoral volatility; coding: # (%); For each cabinet party, the
vote support (%) received at the relevant parliamentary election is subtracted from the
vote support (%) that the same party received at the immediately preceding election; the
absolute value of these scores are summarized for all cabinet parties and then divided by
the number of cabinet parties. Coded in-house 2012, re-calculated for all cabinets.
Tables A.2 and reftab:tabA3replicate Strøm and McClean (2018) in spirit and is based
on variables originated from several sources. The source is indicated in parentheses at
the end of the definition.
Investiture
Defined as above Bucur et al. (2019).
Absolute majority
Defined as above Bucur et al. (2019).
ENP
Eﬀective number of legislative parties (ERDA).
Committees
Index of committee system strength, a 7-point additive scale indicating the degree to
which a country’s committee system is “equipped with the ability to impact the legisla-
tive process” (Martin, 2011, 349).
Volatility
Electoral volatility: diﬀerence between the vote share between two consecutive elections
for all parties with representation in the lower chamber Bucur et al. (2019).
Gain in Vote
Average number of cabinet parties experiencing a positive change in vote share be-
tween two consecutive elections. Defined as count number of parties in cabinet with
[vote_share]   [old_vote_share] <0, divided by the number of parties in the cabinet
Bucur et al. (2019).
Extremism Average of ideology_extremism for cabinet parties. Ideology_extremism,
in turn, indicates how far the policy position of any party (left-right) is from the mean
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Table A.1: Investiture Attributes by Countries and Investiture Regimes
Country Cabinets Decision Rule Timing Consequence Targets HoS Nominates Explicit Dissolution
Austria 22 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Belgium I 27 Simple Maj. Ex-ante Not Spec. Three No No
Belgium II 9 Neg. Maj. Ex-post Not Spec. Three No No
Bulgaria 6 Simple Maj. Ex-post Dissolution Two No Yes
Croatia 9 Abs. Maj. Ex-post Dissolution Two Yes Yes
Czech Republic 11 Simple Maj. Ex-post Dissolution One Yes Yes
Denmark 37 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Estonia 15 Simple Maj. Ex-ante Dissolution Two No Yes
Finland I 38 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Finland II 10 Simple Maj. Ex-ante Not Spec. One Yes No
France I 12 Abs. Maj. Ex-post Not Spec. One Yes No
France II 7 Simple Maj. Ex-post Not Spec. One Yes No
France III 19 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Germany 23 Abs. Maj. Ex-ante Dissolution One No Yes
Greece 4 Low Majority Ex-post Not Spec. One No No
Hungary 8 Abs. Maj. Ex-ante Not Spec. One Yes No
Iceland 31 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Ireland 18 Simple Maj. Ex-ante Not Spec. Three No No
Italy 59 Simple Maj. Ex-post Not Spec. One Yes No
Latvia 22 Simple Maj. Ex-post Not Spec. One Yes No
Lithuania 12 Simple Maj. Ex-ante Dissolution Three Yes Yes
Luxembourg 17 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Netherlands 23 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Norway 45 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest No Invest.
Poland I 1 Abs. Maj. Ex-post Dissolution One Yes Yes
Poland II 17 Abs. Maj. Ex-post Dissolution One Yes Yes
Portugal 13 Neg. Maj. Ex-post Dissolution Two Yes Yes
Romania 19 Abs. Maj. Ex-post Dissolution Two Yes Yes
Slovakia 9 Abs. Maj. Ex-post Not Spec. One No No
Slovenia 16 Simple Maj. Ex-ante Dissolution Two No Yes
Spain 7 Simple Maj. Ex-post Dissolution Two No Yes
Sweden I 10 No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest. No Invest.
Sweden II 17 Neg. Maj. Neg. Maj. One No No
United Kingdom 4 Simple Maj. Ex-post Simple Maj. One No No
Source: Bucur et al. (2019)
(seat-weighted) policy position of all parties (ideology_mean). Both of these variables
are from PARLGOV (Döring and Manow, 2018).
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Table A.2: Logistic regression of minority government on the “investiture
dummy” and other factors - PARLGOV dataset
All Cabinet Formations Post–Election Cabinets
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Investiture -0.4388** 0.2080 -0.33289 0.2835
ENP -0.0760 0.0688 -0.1207 0.9860
Committees 0.2791 0.1949 0.1342 0.2634
Volatility 0.0074 0.0083 0.0031 0.0118
Gain in Vote -0.1715 0.2810 -0.1340 0.3593
Extremism -1.0636 2.6909 1.5860 3.5856
Constant -0.05382 0.6152 -0.4017
Obs 566 320
Pseudo R2 0.0099 Pseudo R2 0.0089
Marginal Eﬀect 0.0992 0.0730
Note: * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Variables defined in the
Appendix.
Table A.3: Logistic regression of minority government on the “absolute
majority dummy” and other factors - PARLGOV dataset
All Cabinet Formations Post–Election Cabinets
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Investiture -0.1689 0.2400 -0.9417** 0.3880
ENP -0.0870 0.0684 -0.1539 0.1007
Committees 0.1529 0.1878 -0.0079 0.2545
Volatility 0.0044 0.0081 0.0048 0.0118
Gain in Vote -0.0765 0.2761 -0.1283 0.3538
Extremism -0.0989 2.6687 1.1993 3.5947
Constant -0.3050 0.6124 -0.1627 0.8499
Obs 566 320
Pseudo R2 0.0045 Pseudo R2 0.0218
Marginal Eﬀect 0.0992 0.1807
Note: * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Variables defined in the
Appendix.
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